As against Russell, I shall say this. Meaning (in at least one important sense) is a function of the sentence or expression; mentioning and referring and truth or falsity, are functions of the use of the sentence or expression. To give the meaning of a sentence (in the sense in which I am using the word) is to give general directions for its use to refer to or mention particular objects or persons; to give the meaning of a sentence is to give general directions for its use in making true or false assertions.... The meaning of an expression cannot be identified with the object it is used, on a particular occasion, to refer to. The meaning of a sentence cannot be identified with the assertion it is used, on a particular occasion, to make.
Sir Peter Frederick Strawson (b. 1919), British philosopher. repr. In Classics of Analytic Philosophy, pp. 315-334, ed. R. Ammerman (1965). "On Referring," v. LIX, no. 235, originally published in Mind (1950).
In opposition to Russell's concept of a proposition.