Quotation by Gottlob Frege

It is natural, now, to think of there being connected with a sign (name, combination of words, letter) besides that to which the sign refers, which may be called the reference of the sign, also what I should like to call the sense of the sign, wherein the mode of presentation is contained. In our example, accordingly, [an example in which lines a, b, and c all intersect at a single point] the reference of the expressions 'the point of intersection of a and b' and 'the point of intersection of b and c' would be the same, but not their senses. The reference of 'evening star' would be the same as that of 'morning star,' but not the sense.
Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), German logicist mathematician, realist philosopher. also trans. as "on Sense and Nominatum," Readings in Philosophical Analysis, eds. H. Feigl and W. Sellars. "On Sense and Reference," pp. 56-78, Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege eds. P. Geach and M. Black (1966).

Source of the author's notorious distinction between two sorts of entities "meant" by linguistic expressions.
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